












































Urban planning is all about land utilization and spatial order. Land is used by private and 
public entities within the confines of the prevalent mixed economy, modified by the rules 
and regulations established by the state with regards to the type and extent of land uses 
and structures allowed and the legal rules dictating institutional and fiduciary 
relationships. Public intervention in the form of such rules and regulations has been quite 
extensive and more or less arbitrary based on prescriptive rules reflective of dominant 
ideologies and interests. City and regional plans developed under these circumstances 
have for the most part faltered or at best rarely ever fully implemented, eventually revised 
by market forces. This is in part because planners and other decision makers are 
inherently incapable of comprehending the multitude of individual subjective value 
judgments which materialize and shape urban realities mainly through the operation of 
the market. The market’s significant advantage over centrally planned action is that it 
signals, quite accurately, through the pricing mechanism the desires and needs of the 
people in a timely fashion. But it is severally handicapped when it comes to dealing with 
whatever does not go through the market; namely public goods and externalities. This is 
where the market signaling mechanism collapses. As a result and for all its advantages 
the market fails to deliver some of the most crucial elements that make up the basic 
infrastructure of a well functioning city (public goods). It also fails in dealing with 
undesirable and often catastrophic side-effects of otherwise legitimate functions (negative 
externalities).  Markets are notorious for failing to deal with those two aspects of 
economic activity. In the end spatial order and land utilization are greatly affected by 
such failures. Malfunctioning markets lead to misallocation of resources (allocative 
inefficiencies) and to other inefficiencies, including often increased inequalities. 
 
Here then lies the predicament of modern planning practice. Government planning action 
has not been able to deal effectively with the dynamic nature of urban and regional 
development problems, often misguiding action, while on the other hand the market is 
inherently incapable by itself of providing some of the basic elements of communal well 
being.   
 
In the past few decades heavy handed planning practices gave raise to criticism of over-
planning and of not allowing enough private choices to materialize. Frequent failure of 
such plans increased the legitimacy of this kind of criticism. Lack of planning or minimal 
planning on the other hand was criticized for lacking the ability to provide adequate 
physical and social infrastructure.  
 
It seems then that the solution lies in a well organized partnership between the two sides, 
where the public and the private sector will share the responsibility of shaping functional 
cities and regions. This partnership should be built on a robust set of rules and regulations 
that reflect the workings of the market and the true role of public authorities. For that 
purpose a brief analysis of the operation of the market in an urban spatial setting is 
necessary in order to isolate its main features and to identify critical public intervention 
vehicles that can mitigate market failure and facilitate the provision of public goods, 
which is the essence of the dual role of the public sector.   
 
 
Property rights assignment and enforcement. 
 
Land utilization depends very much on the definition and assignment of property rights 
enjoyed by individuals and organizations as they seek to pursue their own interests, be 
that wealth maximization or advancement of some other stated or undeclared purpose. 
Property rights relevant to urban development are many and varied and they differ from 
place to place and from time to time. The mix of rights’ bundle changes over time 
following evolution of perceived needs, ideological swings or technological 
improvements.  
 
The exercise of any given right is not without a cost. The enforcement of a bundle of 
property rights depends in every case on the cost of policing the consistent application of 
that right, otherwise also known as ‘transaction costs’. The following expresses the 
relationship between perceived value of any given right and the cost of its enforcement:   
 
Value of right < = > Cost of assigning, applying and enforcement (transaction costs)  
 
Any particular right is then exercised only if its perceived value is higher than the 
transaction costs associated with its realization and enforcement. For as long as the 
perceived value of the property right is lower than the cost of its assignment and 
enforcement, the right is not exercised and the related good or service is not available for 
enjoyment by all who desire it. The left hand side of the equation above represents in 
simple economic parlance demand and the right hand site represents supply. If the supply 
cost is higher than the price the public is willing to pay, then there is no market for the 
good or service associated with the particular right. For example, for as long as leisure 
and vacationing by the sea site during the summer was not perceived (as it happened in 
the 1950s) to be such an important or affordable necessity (as it is perceived to be now) 
there was no demand for sea site properties and their value was low, since the land near 
the sea is typically of poor agricultural value. As the need for vacation became more 
apparent and stronger, the “right” to vacation and to a second (vacation) house by the sea 
became bigger and the value attached to this type of activity and the properties near the 
sea started increasing rapidly. As a result the relevant market became operational, despite 
constantly increasing costs. The cost estimates here are not limited to the provision of 
adequate infrastructure but includes all other related costs such as the cost of legalizing 
the activity, which may be the cost of developing a town plan and it goes so far as to 
include by-passing the legal restrictions and building illegally (common practice in 
Greece). Cumbersome planning efforts lack behind market directives and they are 
typically slow in meeting the current needs of the people. The case of illegal housing 
(mostly second homes) in Greece is in fact a clear case where planning has completely 
failed to meet the real needs of the people.  
 
It is interesting then to examine the supply conditions of the relationship above, in view 
of the ever changing demand. The supply conditions of private goods are straightforward and they don’t have to been examined here. What complicates the analysis of the supply 
side is the presence of urban externalities and public goods, whose treatment has been 




Public goods.  
 
Public goods are characterized by two main features. They are non-excludable and they 
are not rival, so that they are subject to overuse if not abuse by free riders. Undersupplied 
and overused, public goods are subject to congestion becoming eventually rival. 
Subsequent state intervention using regulatory power or private / institutional 
arrangements can introduce certain amount of excludability easing out the rivalry. In the 
end, depending on technology available, these goods may even become private goods, 
namely rival and excludable at the same time. This dynamic progression is shown below.  
 
GOODS. 
Feature EXCLUDABLE  NO-EXCLUDABLE 
RIVAL  Private Goods   (4)  Congested Goods (transitional state) (2)
NO-RIVAL  Club Goods   (3)  Public Goods    (1) 
(Adopted from: Webster, Chris “Property Rights, Planning & Markets”) 
 
The main urban public goods are easily identifiable and defined. In the absence of pricing 
mechanism there is an inherent difficulty in estimating the real value of these goods or 
services, as real preferences are not revealed by the free-rider attitude of the public.  
Monitoring of use can improve information availability but it is typically quite costly and 
unlikely to be undertaken in a systematic way by local governments. Decisions regarding 
the treatment of public goods are in most cases “political” reflective of ideological 
underpinnings and/or of the power of influential special interests.  The form and the 
format under which these goods are supplied may change over time following demand 
volumes, technological innovations and / or swifts in the prevailing ideological paradigm. 
A brief reference here is made to an example familiar to the Greek audience. In the early 
1980’s when the socialist party got in power, bus rides in the large Greek cities were free 
until 8:00 in the morning, ostensibly for the working class to get to go work at no cost. 
This experiment was short lived. Today at the time of extreme privatization, monthly 
passes on the same bus systems are at the same cost level with the normal single one-way 
ticket.         
 
In practice, the provision of congested public goods can be safeguarded and continued if 
it is rationalized either with the application of land use or other type of regulations, 
introducing fiscal measures, or with the creation of “clubs” and club-like institutions by 
either the private or the public sector. Clubs introduce a certain amount of exclusivity that 
decreases rivalry to tolerable levels but they raise issues that have to do with equity, 
redistribution and rent seeking (self-interest promoting) behavior from the part of the 
decision makers.  
 Local authorities should establish well thought off mechanisms and procedures in order 
to:  
a) identify in a timely fashion congested public good,  
b) reveal to the extent possible real public preferences, and then  
c) choose the appropriate form of action, be that regulatory, fiscal or market oriented.   
 






Externalities as side-effects of regular, sanctioned activities have always been a very 
significant factor in shaping urban realm. In general, negative side-effects such as traffic 
jams, noise and high levels of air pollution – to mention only the most common and 
prevalent – tend to work as deterrents to activity concentration, while positive ones tend 
to work the opposite way, increasing concentration of activities. The range of external 
effects both positive and negative is too wide and varied, and a large number of them 
become evident after a certain level of overall activity concentration and / or intensity has 
been achieved. This may very well be a reason why their contribution to urban form has 
not been duly recognized.  
 
The main characteristic of externalities is that they escape the market and that the 
individual activity that causes side effects is typically under-priced (or overpriced in the 
case of positive externalities). In many cases the same activity may cause at the same 
time both positive and negative side-effects, which by nature are difficult to measure and 
compare. Take for example high density development in the form of multistory building, 
such as the ones allowed in the majority of Greek cities. Such dense development has the 
advantage of rendering the operation of mass-transit systems financially viable and of 
increasing overall accessibility to good and services, but on the other hand it creates 
among other things severe parking, congestion and pollution problems. In the end, the 
question is: is high overall density good for the city and if so how much of it? How, then, 
can the density limits be decided upon? How much activity integration or separation is 
desirable?  
 
Master plans and other forms of blue-print development guides usually dictate a certain 
amount of density and a particular kind of mix of various activities and often attempt to 
isolate activities from one another through the use of exclusionary zoning. The latter is a 
pronounced practice in the US in the form of activity (Euclidian) zoning, where large 
tracks of land are dedicated exclusively to one or very few closely related and very well 
specified activities, like single family detached housing, retail centers, etc. Zoning is a 
cruel form of direct regulation attempting to cut down negative side effect of one activity 
on another, invented originally to protect property values. But direct regulations such as 
this that isolate activities, eliminate many positive impacts along with the negative ones. 
Increasing attacks on Euclidian zoning, even within the U.S. in the last twenty years or 
so, are an indication of strong dissatisfaction with this form of traditional planning practice. Is there a better way to limit negative impacts without harming the positive 
ones? Can there be an effective and efficient way of coordinating the action and desires 
of the myriad of people living in a big city to the benefit of all, increasing total welfare? 
What is the best way to develop physical form and land uses that conform with and 
support social and economic relations without doing much harm? Fiscal measures such as 
taxes or subsidies, often used to internalizing external impacts, are for the most part 





Forming voluntary or involuntary associations is an alternative method used to reduce 
information costs and uncertainty in the land market and it involves re-examination of ill-
defined property rights. These associations are typically formed to deal with certain 
coexistence problems and they are quite common at the local level either in the form of 
clubs or as homeowners associations, compulsory or voluntary. The simplest form of this 
kind of arrangement is the condominium regulations governing the behavior of everyone 
sharing the same building facility, be that in downtown Manhattan or on a beach in 
Florida. In Greece this kind of arrangement is very widespread in the form of 
“regulations of operation” prepared by law for every multistory building. These 
regulations dictate certain basic aspects of communal living, excluding certain uses, 
dictating behavior and imposing the costs of coexistence in a prescribed fashion. In 
essence the regulations governing the association limit and re-assign property rights to 
protect the common good of civil coexistence, easing out transaction cost at the same 
time. Some of the regulations included in these agreements are imposed by law and some 
of them are voluntary.  
 
 
Integration of approaches. 
 
The same way building regulations handle externalities within the building, building-
block and neighborhood-wide regulations can handle externalities pertinent to the 
building-block or to the neighborhood. In fact, some of the city-wide problems can be 
more effectively dealt with at the local level. Take again the example of high density. 
One of the biggest problems associated with high density development relates to the use 
of automobile causing parking and traffic congestion. This problem can be dealt with in a 
more effective way by drawing block-wide or neighborhood-wide rules and regulations 
that in essence re-assign some of the property right regarding the use of automobiles. The 
simplest way to move the social cost on the individual causing the problem is to force the 
provision of at least one parking space in situ for each apartment or office built. If such 
simple regulation is strictly enforced, even in the absence of density regulations, it is 
doubtful that high rise buildings will be built outside the center due to the high cost of 
providing the necessary extra parking space. Central areas where property values are 
higher due to the presence of positive externalities, are more likely to contain high rises 
because contractors can afford to build costly underground parking and pass the cost to 
the apartment or office. The farther away from the center, the lower the density will be. In the absence of strict building-height or density regulations tall buildings will be built in 
the center and single family ones near the edge of the city; a pattern resembling Alonso’s 
bid-rent function.  
 
The same property rights reassignment logic can be utilized in many different 
circumstances, as in the case of protecting the character of a neighborhood, historic 
buildings, landmarks, etc. using neighborhood wide regulations. Often a combination of 
fiscal, regulatory and club type arrangements may be considered necessary to deal with 
specific problems. When a building is declared to be of historic value and has to be 
preserved in the common interest, the beneficiaries (the neighbors and society as a whole) 
have to pay for it. If the cost of preservation falls solely on the owner of the building then 
the most certain outcome will be the opposite of what is intended, and historical evidence 
proves this to be the case. In Greece where typically regulations punish the owner of the 
historic property, very few of the old preservable buildings survived, despite the very 
strict laws dictating preservation of such buildings. Most of these buildings are left to be 
destroyed by nature or destroyed intentionally. In the end, most of the “protected” 
buildings of exceptional aesthetic and historic value are gone.    
 
In fact the neighbors and society at large should compensate the owner for two reasons: 
because the building itself contributes to everyone’s welfare, and also because by being 
smaller than what it can otherwise be if rebuilt, contributes much less to traffic, parking 
and other problems. A set of regulations transferring to the preserved building some of 
the increased value captured by the neighboring properties when developed, as a 
compensation for the two reasons mentioned above, would facilitate both overall 
development along with preservation. These rules may include regulatory action by the 
state as well as financial measures that would make the right to develop one’s own land 
conditional on the proper compensation of the owner of the piece of land which cannot be 
developed. If this kind of regulations had been adopted in Greece forty or fifty years ago, 
with the same building ratio we have today, in the end the same overall floor space could 
have been built in most downtowns, with one substantial difference. Most of the beautiful 
buildings of the past would still be in place and the newer buildings probably would have 
been taller with the overall city-wide density being the same.  
 
This is just a simple example of the application of the proposed approach, which can 







Cities aren’t just physical forms but rich and dynamic complexes of social and economic 
relations among people. Cities do not operate by fiat. They are living, dynamic organisms 
obeying the prevalent social and economic forces. Cumbersome, slow moving and non-
responsive planning practices distort organic growth. To increase effectiveness, urban 
planning has to successfully and in timely fashion reflect real needs. Market signaling is one of the most efficient ways to read social and individual needs and the market, 
properly guided, can be a very important planning instrument. Strict master plan type 
regulations have to be limited to bare essentials and increasingly be replaced by dynamic 
arrangements controlling relationships between activities, rather than absolute values. 
Planning and markets have to work in harmony and this assumes inevitably realignment 
of property rights in order to take care of two of the main manifestations of market 
failure: public goods and externalities. Ignoring or side stepping the public goods and 
externality issues is to bestow rights to all sorts of polluters and to those who take 
advantage of a poorly managed and thus defend-less society.  
 
 
 
 
  
  